Managerial Economics

10.

Game Theory and Strategic Behavior

10.1.

Introduction to Game Theory

10.1.1.

Historical Development

10.1.2.

Importance in Managerial Economics

10.1.3.

Applications in Business Strategy

10.2.

Elements of a Game

10.2.1.

10.2.2.

10.2.3.

10.2.4.

Information Structure

10.2.5.

Rules of the Game

10.3.

10.3.1.

Simultaneous vs. Sequential Games

10.3.2.

One-Shot vs. Repeated Games

10.3.3.

Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Games

10.3.4.

Zero-Sum vs. Non-Zero-Sum Games

10.3.5.

Complete vs. Incomplete Information

10.4.

Representing Games

10.4.1.

10.4.2.

10.4.3.

Strategic Form vs. Extensive Form

10.5.

Solution Concepts

10.5.1.

Dominant Strategy

10.5.1.1.

Strictly Dominant

10.5.1.2.

Weakly Dominant

10.5.2.

Nash Equilibrium

10.5.2.1.

Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

10.5.2.2.

Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

10.5.3.

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

10.5.4.

Backward Induction

10.6.

Classic Game Theory Models

10.6.1.

Prisoners' Dilemma

10.6.1.1.

Structure and Implications

10.6.1.2.

Real-World Applications

10.6.2.

Battle of the Sexes

10.6.3.

Coordination Games

10.6.4.

10.6.5.

10.7.

Strategic Moves

10.7.1.

10.7.2.

10.7.3.

10.7.4.

Entry Deterrence

10.7.5.

Credibility of Strategic Moves

10.8.

10.8.1.

Finite vs. Infinite Repetition

10.8.2.

Trigger Strategies

10.8.3.

10.8.4.

Reputation Effects

10.9.

Applications in Business

10.9.1.

10.9.2.

Advertising Competition

10.9.3.

Product Launch Timing

10.9.4.

Capacity Investment

10.9.5.

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11. Risk, Uncertainty, and Decision-Making