Market Design and Pricing Strategies

4.

Matching Markets

4.1.

Matching Market Fundamentals

4.1.1.

Characteristics of Matching Markets

4.1.1.1.

Two-Sided Markets

4.1.1.2.

Absence of Prices

4.1.1.3.

Preference-Based Allocation

4.1.1.4.

Stability Concepts

4.1.2.

Matching vs. Auction Markets

4.1.2.1.

Key Differences

4.1.2.2.

When to Use Each Approach

4.1.2.3.

Hybrid Mechanisms

4.2.

Matching Theory

4.2.1.

Stability Concepts

4.2.1.1.

Individual Rationality

4.2.1.2.

Pairwise Stability

4.2.1.3.

4.2.2.

Matching Algorithms

4.2.2.1.

Gale-Shapley Algorithm

4.2.2.2.

Top Trading Cycles

4.2.2.3.

Serial Dictatorship

4.2.3.

Properties of Matching Mechanisms

4.2.3.1.

Strategy-Proofness

4.2.3.2.

4.2.3.3.

4.3.

Two-Sided Matching

4.3.1.

Marriage Markets

4.3.1.1.

Stable Marriage Problem

4.3.1.2.

Deferred Acceptance Algorithm

4.3.1.3.

Proposer Optimality

4.3.2.

College Admissions

4.3.2.1.

Student-Optimal Matching

4.3.2.2.

College-Optimal Matching

4.3.2.3.

Capacity Constraints

4.3.3.

4.3.3.1.

4.3.3.2.

Residency Matching

4.3.3.3.

Professional Services

4.4.

One-Sided Matching

4.4.1.

House Allocation

4.4.1.1.

Top Trading Cycles

4.4.1.2.

Random Serial Dictatorship

4.4.1.3.

Efficiency and Fairness

4.4.2.

4.4.2.1.

Boston Mechanism

4.4.2.2.

Deferred Acceptance

4.4.2.3.

Strategy-Proofness

4.5.

Matching Market Applications

4.5.1.

Medical Residency Matching

4.5.1.1.

National Resident Matching Program

4.5.1.2.

Couples Matching

4.5.1.3.

Specialty Matching

4.5.2.

Kidney Exchange

4.5.2.1.

Pairwise Exchange

4.5.2.2.

Chains and Cycles

4.5.2.3.

Compatibility Constraints

4.5.3.

School Assignment

4.5.3.1.

Mechanism Design

4.5.3.2.

Policy Implications

4.5.3.3.

Empirical Evidence

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5. Platform Economics and Multi-Sided Markets