Public Finance

9.

Political Economy of Public Finance

9.1.

Public Choice Theory

9.1.1.

Voting and Political Processes

9.1.1.1.

The Median Voter Theorem

9.1.1.2.

Voting Paradoxes

9.1.1.3.

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

9.1.1.4.

Voting Mechanisms

9.1.2.

Interest Groups and Lobbying

9.1.2.1.

Collective Action Problems

9.1.2.2.

Rent-Seeking Behavior

9.1.2.3.

Regulatory Capture

9.1.2.4.

Campaign Contributions

9.1.3.

Bureaucracy and Government Failure

9.1.3.1.

Principal-Agent Problems

9.1.3.2.

Budget Maximization

9.1.3.3.

Bureaucratic Inefficiency

9.1.4.

Political Business Cycles

9.1.4.1.

Electoral Cycles and Fiscal Policy

9.1.4.2.

Opportunistic vs. Partisan Models

9.2.

Behavioral Public Finance

9.2.1.

Bounded Rationality and Heuristics

9.2.1.1.

Cognitive Biases

9.2.1.2.

Mental Accounting

9.2.1.3.

Framing Effects

9.2.2.

Applications to Tax Policy

9.2.2.1.

9.2.2.2.

Complexity and Compliance

9.2.2.3.

Withholding and Third-Party Reporting

9.2.3.

Applications to Spending Policy

9.2.3.1.

Default Options in Social Programs

9.2.3.2.

Nudges and Choice Architecture

9.2.3.3.

Commitment Devices

9.2.4.

Behavioral Welfare Economics

9.2.4.1.

Revealed vs. Normative Preferences

9.2.4.2.

Paternalism and Libertarian Paternalism

9.3.

Tax Compliance and Evasion

9.3.1.

Economics of Tax Compliance

9.3.1.1.

Detection Probability

9.3.1.2.

9.3.1.3.

9.3.2.

Types of Tax Evasion

9.3.2.1.

Underreporting Income

9.3.2.2.

Overstating Deductions

9.3.2.3.

Informal Economy

9.3.3.

Enforcement Strategies

9.3.3.1.

9.3.3.2.

Third-Party Reporting

9.3.3.3.

Information Matching

9.3.3.4.

Voluntary Compliance Programs

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10. International Public Finance