Game Theory

2.

Fundamental Elements of Games

2.1.

2.1.1.

Definition and Identification

2.1.2.

Individual vs. Collective Players

2.1.3.

Number of Players

2.1.3.1.

Two-Player Games

2.1.3.2.

Multi-Player Games

2.1.3.3.

2.1.4.

Player Characteristics

2.1.4.1.

2.1.4.2.

2.1.4.3.

Information Access

2.2.

2.2.1.

Pure Strategies

2.2.1.1.

Definition and Examples

2.2.1.2.

2.2.1.3.

Finite vs. Infinite Strategy Spaces

2.2.2.

Mixed Strategies

2.2.2.1.

Probability Distributions

2.2.2.2.

Support of Mixed Strategies

2.2.2.3.

Randomization Devices

2.2.3.

Behavioral Strategies

2.2.3.1.

Conditional Probability Distributions

2.2.3.2.

Relationship to Mixed Strategies

2.3.

Actions and Moves

2.3.1.

Individual Actions

2.3.2.

2.3.3.

Feasible Actions

2.3.4.

Timing of Actions

2.4.

Information Structure

2.4.1.

Perfect Information

2.4.1.1.

Complete Observability

2.4.1.2.

Sequential Decision-Making

2.4.2.

Imperfect Information

2.4.2.1.

Information Sets

2.4.2.2.

Simultaneous Moves

2.4.2.3.

2.4.3.

Complete Information

2.4.3.1.

2.4.3.2.

Known Strategy Sets

2.4.4.

Incomplete Information

2.4.4.1.

Private Information

2.4.4.2.

Types and Beliefs

2.4.4.3.

Uncertainty About Opponents

2.5.

Payoffs and Outcomes

2.5.1.

Payoff Functions

2.5.1.1.

Mapping from Strategy Profiles

2.5.1.2.

Numerical Representation

2.5.2.

Utility Functions

2.5.2.1.

Ordinal Utility

2.5.2.2.

Cardinal Utility

2.5.2.3.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility

2.5.3.

2.5.3.1.

Feasible Outcomes

2.5.3.2.

Pareto Efficiency

2.5.3.3.

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1. Introduction to Game Theory

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3. Game Classification and Representation