Evolution and the Theory of Games
Evolution and the Theory of Games is a book by the British evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith on evolutionary game theory. The book was initially published in December 1982 by Cambridge Univers
Stag hunt
In game theory, the stag hunt, sometimes referred to as the assurance game, trust dilemma or common interest game, describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. The stag hunt problem ori
Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is the application of game theory to evolving populations in biology. It defines a framework of contests, strategies, and analytics into which Darwinian competition can
Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
A weak evolutionarily stable strategy (WESS) is a more broad form of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Like ESS, a WESS is able to defend against an invading "mutant" strategy. This means the WESS
Chicken (game)
The game of chicken, also known as the hawk–dove game or snowdrift game, is a model of conflict for two players in game theory. The principle of the game is that while the ideal outcome is for one pla
Bishop–Cannings theorem
The Bishop–Cannings theorem is a theorem in evolutionary game theory. It states that (i) all members of a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) have the same payoff (Theorem 2), and (ii) that non
Fisher's principle
Fisher's principle is an evolutionary model that explains why the sex ratio of most species that produce offspring through sexual reproduction is approximately 1:1 between males and females. A. W. F.
Mobbing (animal behavior)
Mobbing in animals is an antipredator adaptation in which individuals of prey species mob a predator by cooperatively attacking or harassing it, usually to protect their offspring. A simple definition
Evolutionarily stable strategy
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (or set of strategies) that is impermeable when adopted by a population in adaptation to a specific environment, that is to say it cannot be displ
Stochastically stable equilibrium
In game theory, a stochastically stable equilibrium is a refinement of the evolutionarily stable state in evolutionary game theory, proposed by and Peyton Young. An evolutionary stable state S is also
Replicator equation
In mathematics, the replicator equation is a deterministic monotone non-linear and non-innovative game dynamic used in evolutionary game theory. The replicator equation differs from other equations us
Cultural group selection
Cultural group selection is an explanatory model within cultural evolution of how cultural traits evolve according to the competitive advantage they bestow upon a group. This multidisciplinary approac
Evolutionarily stable set
In game theory an evolutionarily stable set (ES set), sometimes referred to as evolutionary stable sets, is a set of strategies, which score equally against each other, each of which would be an evolu
Evolutionarily stable state
A population can be described as being in an evolutionarily stable state when that population's "genetic composition is restored by selection after a disturbance, provided the disturbance is not too l
Risk dominance
Risk dominance and payoff dominance are two related refinements of the Nash equilibrium (NE) solution concept in game theory, defined by John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten. A Nash equilibrium is consid